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ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN AMERICA: GILDED AGE
BEGINNINGS AND WORLD WAR I LEGACIES
The early decades of the twentieth century proved pivotal for defining academic freedom in
America. The challenges of World War I ultimately strengthened the use and understanding of
the concept specifically for the U.S. context. During the last third of the nineteenth century, a
number of developments in higher learning had converged, bringing academic independence
urgently to the forefront. Growth and professionalization meant a new role for universities in Amer-
ican society; big-business philanthropy saw sciences flourish, but it also introduced a new market-
orientated organization to college administration. Gilded Age and Progressive Era debates over
individual rights, social responsibilities, and public and political capital caused much controversy
on campuses across the country. German academic institutions, long cherished models in U.S.-
reform-rhetoric, had begun to lose their appeal, and by 1914, they were fully discredited. Hence,
even before the United States entered into the conflict, World War I forced the academic commu-
nity to define their position between society, government, and professional ethos. During this
process, two very different notions of academic freedom emerged: one favoring individual liberties,
the other one prioritizing institutional integrity. These distinctive and potentially adverse interpre-
tations continued to function as the basis for legal and public arguments as the twentieth century
progressed.
The problem with academic freedom, as with other liberties, is that it is many things to
many people and, in fact, different kinds of academic freedom, invoked by different
groups within the academic system (e.g., professors, students, administrators) may
even infringe upon each other. Moreover, in historical perspective, different interpreta-
tions served different interest groups over time depending on political constellations,
social hierarchies, and economic power structures. There seems to be some disagreement
as to the origin of academic freedom in America: Is academic freedom rooted in key
American ideals like civil liberty and religious freedom, and therefore “not an ancient
prerogative but an acquisition of relatively recent date”1—or should we see it as “one
of the few last and precious survivals of genuine European culture”?2 Arguably, this dis-
crepancy is caused by an inverted chronology of academic freedom in the United States:
in Europe academic freedom had traditionally been a privilege granted to a professional
class in pre- and early-modern societies before there were declarations of general rights,
including freedom of speech and the freedom of the press. In the United States, however,
these rights were established for all citizens in the founding documents and the idea of
any professional privilege was generally viewed with suspicion.3 Thus, while in
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Europe academic freedom predated civil liberties, in the United States it was vice versa.
So, what exactly could be the nature of academic freedom in America?
The historiography of this topic in the United States is still dominated by seminal pub-
lications from the 1950s.4 In the wake of the onslaught on universities during the McCar-
thy Era and amidst the ideologically charged atmosphere of the Cold War, academics of
various political convictions contemplated, historicized, and reframed the concept. Thus,
the 1950s are lodged in the memory of U.S. academia as a pivotal moment in the evolu-
tion of academic freedom. However, its defining moment in America had occurred forty
years earlier as the First World War galvanized different positions and provided the
context for the initial steps toward codification. Since the last third of the nineteenth
century, a debate had simmered regarding the role of universities and the responsibilities
of the scholar in U.S. society. It boiled over as passions heated up during the war and
academic freedom proved to be a central fulcrum. This essay traces two different inter-
pretations of academic freedom as they emerged during the first two decades of the twen-
tieth century. One of them was rooted in the progressivist notions of government
protection against industrial and economic exploitation, and the other one was based
on the notion of institutional autonomy and academic independence in the face of
popular—or populist —opinion and majority pressure. As different and at times seem-
ingly irreconcilable as these two approaches may appear, they both sprang from the spe-
cific social and historical moment in the United States. The former was brought on by the
rapid expansion, commodification, and structural change in the landscape of higher edu-
cation, while the latter was prompted more specifically by the charged political atmo-
sphere during World War I. Yet, both continued to inform the discourse as the
American university and college system evolved throughout the twentieth and into the
twenty-first century.
1 . THE TRANSATLANT IC ROOTS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM?
The decades following the Civil War saw American higher education transformed as the
multifaceted system we know today in all its complexity took shape between 1870 and
1910.5 New formats of teaching and learning, more differentiated fields of research, and
the professionalization of disciplines broadened and institutionalized the academic
world.6 While higher education had been predominantly private, and a new wave of phil-
anthropic gifts between 1870 and 1890 further strengthened that line, the individual
states, and gradually even the federal government, began to take a more active role.
Land Grant Colleges and state-university clusters emerged after the Morrill Acts (1862
and 1890) while older U.S. colleges reformed and developed into “full universities”,
that is, institutions dedicated to research, as well as teaching, and began bestowing
advanced degrees.
A vaguely defined “German impact” has a well-established place in the historical nar-
rative of the American Research University—both public and private—as it emerged
during those decades.7 American graduates returning home after pursuing advanced
studies at German universities throughout the nineteenth century impacted newly
founded institutions like Johns Hopkins and Cornell University. The networks they
formed abroad would dominate U.S. higher education for decades to come.8 Yet,
while the German model certainly featured prominently in the rhetoric of renewal and
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reform, any transatlantic inspiration in this respect was merely a matter of selective acqui-
sition, (re-)interpretation and local application.9 The adaptation of the concept of aca-
demic freedom is a case in point.
Traditionally the history of academic freedom in Germany traces its theoretical
grounding to Wilhelm von Humboldt, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Gottlieb Fichte, and
the founding of Berlin University in 1810/11.10 It was their ruminations on the issue
that Americans (like their German colleagues) incessantly and piously quoted. But, of
course, there are numerous antecedents upon which these thinkers based their ideas,
reaching back to the libertas philosophandi of the Enlightenment and even further to
the medieval university community. After 1848 many German state constitutions
included codification of academic freedom, then generally referred to as Lehrfreiheit
and Lernfreiheit, the freedom of teaching and learning.11 By the late nineteenth
century, German academic life was organized in public institutions and conducted by
civil-servant professors, while the loaded terminology of Wissenschaft, informed by a
romanticized Enlightenment, rendered academic freedom a metaphysical notion rather
than a practical working principle.12 Nevertheless, in the language of the higher-educa-
tion reformers in the United States, academic freedom with a German undertone
remained a distinctive feature of a “true university”—ritually invoked but rarely
defined.13
Cultural characteristics and conditions complicated the translation of the German prin-
ciple to the American reality. Though administration lay with the state, internal decisions
at German universities remained in the hands of professors creating “the appearance of
self-governed bodies,” especially in the eyes of visitors from abroad.14 According to
the German interpretation, the state guaranteed the external conditions for internal
freedom.15 Underlying the German understanding of academic freedom, therefore,
was a very different notion of freedom and of the role of the state than prevailed in the
United States, where freedom traditionally means absence of the state. However, to
Americans their own universities seemed clearly more vulnerable to external influences,
governed as they were by boards of trustees, who they thought were posing a much larger
threat to free research than the state. By the turn of the century, the places of overseers and
administrators were mostly taken by business leaders and municipal representatives
driving back the religious dominance of earlier decades. In consequence, market consid-
erations and management processes presented new limitations on the freedom to
research, a constellation mostly absent from the German academic world (at that
time). An underlying conflict of religious doctrine and scientific argument remained
present (to this day), but Darwinism alone did not “secularize” American science.16
During the early years of the twentieth century, American professors were beginning
to invoke academic freedom more directly in defense of their autonomy against the eco-
nomic or administrative interests of their institution and more explicitly in relation to
employment. The restructuring of American higher education during the last third of
the nineteenth century contributed to the emergence of new interest groups and new
power structures that would also affect the way Americans thought about academic
freedom.
Some U.S. academics around the turn of the century looked to Germany and almost
regretted that their central government did not have the same authority to insulate univer-
sities from infringements caused by private interests and public opinion.17 The role of
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German scholars inWorldWar I propaganda, however, profoundly challenged this ideal-
isation. On October 4, 1914, in an act of almost instantaneous (self-)mobilization, ninety-
three prominent academics and luminaries of the German cultural elite issued a manifesto
in defense of their government’s acts of war.18 Even before the publication of this Man-
ifesto of the 93, men like theologian Adolf von Harnack, biologist Ernst Haeckel, or clas-
sicist EduardMeyer, whomany Americans considered academic idols, took up the pen to
woo their colleagues in the neutral states. American professors became the bewildered
addressees of numerous patriotic letters and propagandistic pamphlets written by their
German colleagues.19 Aghast Chicago sociologist Albion Small observed the “utter col-
lapse of an objective attitude.”20 How could those balanced and rational minds swoop to
such passionate political lows? To be “writing without composure, judging without con-
sideration of the data”21 seemed so out of character for German scholars, who had
claimed admiration especially in America for their diligence and thoroughness. Surely,
some American observers injected, there had to have been government pressure to con-
vince these representatives of culture and scholarship to put their names to such blatant
propaganda. But even before the war German culture, or Kultur, had started to lose
ground in the United States.22 Along with it, the traditional homage payed to German
universities and their venerated Wissenschaft had been challenged by a younger genera-
tion of American scholars who objected to “the conquest of American universities by
German scholarship.”23 In this vein Americans had also questioned the reality of Lehr-
freiheit in Germany even before 1914. They had found proof in cases such as the dis-
missal of Jewish socialist Leo Arons from Berlin University in 1897 and the ensuing
special law that underscored government influence on university appointments. Now
the political outbursts of German professors seemed sad proof: Lehrfreiheit was dead,
provided it ever really existed. The state-employed German scholar had to dance to
the kaiser’s tune.
Not everyone in America was willing to consider those German professors who had
authored passionate pamphlets, as victims of an absolutist state denying them their lib-
erties. Quite to the contrary, seeing that they had not acted under duress but out of
their own free will, Arthur O. Lovejoy chided German scholars for this “ungodly spec-
tacle” that he considered “a scandalous episode in the history of the scholar’s profes-
sion.”24 After all, Americans knew from Friedrich Paulsen, one of the prime
interpreters of the German university system for U.S. audiences that in Germany, in par-
ticular, “the scholar cannot and should not engage in politics.”25
Examining these different American interpretations of Germany’s propaganda profes-
sors closely reveals an inherent dilemma in the assessment of the nature of academic
freedom that U.S. scholars were dealing with at home: if any political activity had to
be classed as unscholarly conduct, reprimanding or even dismissing professors for
such actions could not be considered an infringement on academic freedom. This,
however, raised questions about the much-quoted Leo Arons case, who allegedly had
lost his job because of his political activities as a socialist.26 For many Americans con-
cerned with the issue of academic freedom Arons’s dismissal hit close to home. The
majority of the U.S. cases in the early years circled around political convictions rather
than research; and socialist views happened to be among those most objectionable to cap-
italist-minded trustees and donors. Accusation from within the professoriate against uni-
versity administrations and bureaucracies grew stronger. Some critics, like Chicago
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sociologist Thorstein Veblen, lost their positions. The question beckoned: Where did
political action begin? How could academics fulfill their democratic obligation and
responsibility to the community while locked away safely in their impartial ivory
tower exercising “detached criticism of cool consideration”?27 The advent of new
fields like economics, sociology, psychology, and political sciences blurred the lines
further. American academics thus faced a profound dilemma caught between free
research and responsibility to the community—a dilemma that still taxes theorist today.28
2 . THE AAUP , ACADEMIC FREEDOM, AND THE WAR
One of the first widely discussed incidents highlighting the somewhat precarious condi-
tions of academic freedom in America was the removal of economist Edward Ross from
his position at Stanford in 1900. He had campaigned against monopoly politics in the
railroad industry and against the importation of cheap labor from Asia. Founding
donor of the university, the late Leland Stanford, however, had made his fortune in the
railroad business. His widow, who after the death of her husband was the sole authority
on the university’s business decisions, would not have her husband’s legacy assailed. Nor
did she approve of Stanford professors campaigning for political convictions counter to
her own.29 The Ross case made abundantly clear that, for all the talk of academic
freedom, there was no legal process of appeal, no controlling body that could champion
the abstract ideal in these very real circumstances of employment.
Roughly half of the best-known cases relating to questionable dismissals between
1893 and 1900 concerned economists. In the often industrialist and business-minded
milieu of Gilded Age philanthropy, economic beliefs polarized. Time and again, profes-
sors lost their position for speaking out against monopolies, taking a strong position on
the silver question or advocating labor rights.30 Eventually, the American Economic
Association (AEA, founded in 1885) took on the task and launched an examination
into the Ross case. While they did not achieve much, their commitment set a precedent
that similar bodies in other disciplines like the American Society of Sociology (founded
1905) and the American Political Sciences Association (APSA, founded 1903) emulated
in the following years. The efforts in favor of academic freedom undertaken by these dif-
ferent professional organizations evolved into a joint caucus, officially named “Commit-
tee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure.” They convened for their initiation
meeting in June 1914.31 For the first time, there was a caucus dedicated to academic
freedom, and it was organized from within the faculties. As such, the new committee
saw its task not only in perusing cases but it also intended to put academic freedom on
a proper conceptual footing. From these beginnings emerged the American Association
of University Professors (AAUP) founded in January 1915 under the leadership of prag-
matist philosopher John Dewey and historian Arthur O. Lovejoy. Academic freedom
would remain one of its central issues, especially as it related to tenure.
Within the first few months of its constitution, the AAUP had already been asked to
take action in eleven different cases, most of which did not involve the war or American
neutrality but were mostly connected to labor and economic issues. Time and personnel
limited the freshly formed advocate organization to following up on five of the eleven
instances.32 Less than one year later, in December 1915, the AAUP issued aDeclaration
of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, which was to become the first official
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step toward codification.33 Two-thirds of the committee members had studied in
Germany and the very first sentence explicitly referred back to German antecedents:
“The term academic freedom has traditionally had two applications, Lehrfreiheit and
Lernfreiheit.”34 The latter was dismissed almost immediately, for the AAUP was not
concerned with the rights of the students. The preamble then distinguished three different
“elements” of academic freedom: freedom of inquiry and research, freedom of teaching,
and “freedom of extra-mural utterance and action.” Quickly concluding that the freedom
of inquiry had rarely been threatened in the past, that issue was also dropped and the
report instead focused on the other two. Thus, in its very first paragraph this AAUP dec-
laration remodeled the idea of academic freedom to fit the demands of American higher
education, namely teaching and the interaction with society at large. Modalities of
employment and the rights of faculty as employees were to be linked closely to academic
freedom.
The new organization both expressed and formalized an emerging collective professo-
rial identity: “acknowledging that the revolution in higher learning had turned their voca-
tion into a profession.”35 While still quite homogenous, integrating the American
professoriate in such a way also required a clear position on the relationship between aca-
demia and society and a sharpening of the much-quoted “service function” of the Amer-
ican university, its obligation to society.36 Only months later the Great War urged
Americans everywhere to clearly define their stance within an ever more pronounced
and politicized public sphere. How would educators reconcile civil liberties, scholarly
obligation, and the either public or private administration of higher education in a capi-
talist democracy?
In their first declaration, the AAUP committee had asserted that no university board,
president, or donor could order professors to give up their constitutional right. Academic
freedom could not be more limited than freedom of speech. No matter if a professor was
speaking to his students in the classroom or to a broader public; he was to be entirely free
to express his views and ideas, just like any other citizen. The cases during the previous
years had shown the importance of taking a stand like that, since donors still had a pow-
erful lobby.37 Moreover, universities were beginning to pay considerable attention to
their institutional image and administrators were attempting to regulate the actions of
the professoriate arguing that their behavior would reflect on their institutions.38 Colum-
bia University’s powerful and influential president Nicholas M. Butler explained: “When
a teacher accepts an invitation to become a member of an academic society, he thereupon
loses some of the freedom that he formerly possessed.… he has voluntarily accepted the
restrictions put upon him by the traditions, the organization, and the purpose of the insti-
tution with which he has become associated.”39 Considering the powerful label of big
universities like Columbia well beyond the academic context, the president was certainly
right to suppose: “Try as he may, he can no longer write or speak in his own name
alone.”40 Clearly, in Butler’s opinion the status of a professor did not warrant special lib-
erties, but rather special duties. Nevertheless, the AAUP argued, that this left the univer-
sity administrators with too much authority and leeway to interpret what “the purpose of
the institution” may entail. In fact, President Butler and Columbia University would
become the centre of attention in the next major academic freedom case, after the
United States had entered the Great War.
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In view of the high proportion of German-born or German-educated scholars at Amer-
ican universities, campuses came under particular scrutiny as a wave of hyper-patriotism
and anti-German paranoia swept the U.S. home front in 1917. There were at least twenty
known dismissals on charges of disloyalty and experts assume the dark figure to be con-
siderably higher.41 Most prominently, the case of Columbia psychologist JamesMcKeen
Cattell seemed to fly in the face of the freshly declared principles of academic freedom.
The dispute was covered extensively in the press and historian Charles Beard resigned his
chair in protest.42 Various representatives of the AAUP as members of the Columbia
faculty found themselves personally ensnared in the issue. Cattell’s dismissal was partic-
ularly controversial because he had been a thorn in the university’s side ever since the
publication of his bitingly critical book University Control in 1913.43 These circum-
stances gave rise to speculation that the war was simply providing the pretext to
finally get rid of an unpleasant employee. All the more so as, with relations already
soured, the latest conflict related neither directly to the war nor to national politics but
was sparked by Cattell’s disrespectful comment about Butler, whom he had ironically
labeled “our many talented and much climbing president.”44 A few months later, with
the dispute not yet resolved, Cattell lobbied congressmen against legislation relating to
the draft. Not only was this considered unpatriotic—at a time when the whole campus
was mobilizing for war—he also used his Columbia credentials in the process. These
actions were cited as giving the university cause to charge and dismiss him.45
While the AAUP did come to the conclusion that the removal had been unjust, they
had to accept that they had still little to no authority to enforce their decision. Neverthe-
less, immediately after Cattell had lost his position—and in direct reaction to the public
outcry—the AAUP’s committee on academic freedom took the initiative to adjust and
amend their Declaration of Principles “with especial reference to the extraordinary sit-
uation created by war.”46 The ensuing special committee report on Academic Freedom
in Wartime, drafted by Lovejoy, can easily be interpreted as a wholesale submission to
government restrictions on civil liberties. It contains all the key arguments used in legis-
lation and court rulings pertaining to the Espionage Act: the challenges of unity in a
democracy at war, the doctrine of clear and imminent danger, and the need to prioritize
safety over freedom for the good of the majority.47 Had the principles of academic
freedom so grandly extolled two years before been sacrificed on the altar of patriotism?
Not quite. In the context of the AAUP’s general agenda, this policy followed logically
from the previous stance. The central point remained to safeguard faculty rights
against the power of the administrators. Appealing to the legal authority of the govern-
ment meant taking the power away from institutional bureaucracies. The committee
quoted Canadian philosophy professor Herbert L. Stewart: “A university board is not
the executive government and, if it so mistakes its function, it is exactly similar to a
mob which beats an unpopular speaker.”48 Thus, the report keenly reiterated its original
statement that academic freedom was an application of First Amendment Rights to the
academic context and insisted: “academic office neither diminishes nor enhances the
ordinary rights and responsibilities of a citizen.”49
With hindsight, we may be inclined to ask why the AAUP did not make it a priority, in
the interest of academic freedom, to protect professors from restrictive government leg-
islation, instead even invoking it. But for them, due to the American system of higher
education, the threat came from a different direction. It came from the trustees and the
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university management. The AAUP’s report on Academic Freedom in Wartime thus pre-
sents one of the earliest examples of the application of the concept in one of its distinctly
American interpretations, as an instrument of employment politics. Critics like James
McKeen Cattell and Thorstein Veblen argued that the commercialization and bureaucra-
tization of universities during the Gilded Age had turned higher education into an indus-
try not unlike the oil or the steel business, and consequently professors were employees
who had to resort to strategies similar to those of the labor movement. Based on ideas of
collective bargaining and professional solidarity against bureaucracies and capital-driven
influences, this take on academic freedom was shaped by some of the same methods and
antagonisms that shaped the labor struggle in America during the early decades of the
twentieth century.
3 . DEF IN ING ACADEMIC FREEDOM FROM THE ADMIN ISTRATOR ’S
PERSPECT IVE
The AAUP’s efforts were focused on upholding the professoriate’s independence against
their institution’s administrators. However, during the preceding decades, academic
freedom had been rhetorically cast as the hallmark of a true university. Therefore, it
was also in the interest of these governing bodies to keep the notion alive in and for
their institutions. Thus, somewhat ironically, several university presidents, usually arche-
types of omnipotent higher-education bureaucrats, were among the most ardent defend-
ers of academic freedom during the war. Their notion of academic freedom, however,
was very different from the AAUP’s and arguably more in line with the continental inter-
pretation of the university as a safe haven of open discourse insulated from public inter-
ference. Nevertheless, for these administrators, government was not the prime threat
either. Instead, they were keen to safeguard their campus against the dangerous currents
of public opinion now agitated, as they saw it, by war-related hysteria. Former Princeton
president Woodrow Wilson, who had left the campus for the political arena in 1910 and
entered the White House in 1912, declared in 1914: “Americans ought to be neutral in
mind and in deeds.”50 This was doubly true for universities, believed Lawrence
Lowell, the head of Harvard University since 1909. Scholarship, as such, was to
refrain from political partisanship. During the neutrality years though, when it came to
the European conflict, unlike Wilson, Lowell drew a sharp distinction between personal
neutrality—which he believed impossible in view of the emotional nature of the war—
and institutional neutrality. The latter was to be the aim of American universities. The
campus ought to be an arena where ideas could be exchanged freely, including those per-
taining to the different views of the belligerents. But asWilson was struggling to maintain
his policy of national neutrality, so Lowell was faced with repeated challenges to aca-
demic—and institutional—integrity. Alumni repeatedly demanded the dismissal of
German-born professors, a student poem ridiculing the German army had sparked
public debate beyond the campus, and German propaganda tried to use Harvard Yard
as a stage.51
Having grown up in France, in private Lowell was decidedly pro-Entente, but publicly
he ritually and routinely invoked academic freedom and explained that the university
could not “muzzle” its professors.52 Any censorship would set a dangerous precedent,
he argued and insisted, at a time when academic freedom had been abandoned in
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Germany—its place of origin—it was up to American academia to uphold the noble
ideal.53 Based on his experience during the years of American neutrality, by 1917
Lowell had developed his own declaration of principle on academic freedom. The state-
ment was first published as part of his presidential report for the academic year 1916–17.
It came out almost simultaneously with the AAUP’s second declaration and generated an
equally broad response.54
The Harvard president distinguished along two parameters: the situation—in class and
outside class—and the content—on topic and off topic. Topic here referred to the profes-
sor’s area of expertise. For expressions in class on topic, guided by professional research,
Lowell passionately invoked the traditional notion of Lehrfreiheit, though he avoided the
German term under the given circumstances. Moreover, every expert should be free to
discuss his findings in the public sphere, guarded by civil liberty and guided only by pro-
priety and decorum. Here Lowell argued from the administrator’s perspective pointing
out that a professor making an improper spectacle of himself and his research posed a
greater threat to the good name of the institution, than potentially controversial
content. When it came to “extramural utterances,” the realm the AAUP report mostly
focused on, Lowell was technically entirely in agreement with them. Speaking off
topic anywhere, any scholar should simply be regarded as a private citizen and guaran-
teed freedom of speech.55 While the president admitted that the social status of a profes-
sor granted the kind of public impact that could do a lot of damage, not to mention the
irritation it may course for his institution, he still believed “that the principle of
freedom warrants temporary annoyance.”56 He thus directly opposed Butler’s view,
who strongly believed professors owed it to their institutions to refrain from public con-
troversy or anything that could reflect badly on the university. But Lowell was not alone
with his view and soon other university presidents issued similar statements.57
However, where the AAUP, in an effort to stress professorial independence guarded
by constitutional rights, followed government legislation to warrant restrictions on
what academics (or any citizen) could say during wartime, both on and off campus,
Lowell would have none of it. In class, an exclusive space guarded by confidentiality,
Lowell believed any scholar should be free to speak his mind on all issues even in the
role of authority he enjoyed as a teacher. After all, in the academic context, Lowell
explained, one could expect an audience capable of forming their own critical views: a
condition that unfortunately, he added, the excitable general public lacked.58 Therefore,
academic freedom also meant that what they heard from their professors in class, students
could not repeat before a public forum, let alone in the press. A number of journalists felt
offended by this implication and addressed their concerns directly to Lowell, but he
insisted that a bond of confidentiality in the classroom was absolutely necessary.59 For
the Harvard president in 1917, academic freedom created a sovereign space within the
campus walls, where a community of students and scholars were free to teach and
learn insulated against public opinion.60 This notion may seem closer to the German con-
cepts of Lehrfreiheit (and Lernfreiheit), and on the American campus it also shielded
against government interference, but at the same time the power of trustees and admin-
istrators grew further. Hence, ultimately it threatened the academic freedom of the
faculty.
The ambivalence of the neutrality years and the demands of the home front after 1917
tested the reality of American civil liberties in general. Academic freedom proved
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particularly difficult to grapple with as the social role of the new universities was still
vague and a professional identity of the professoriate was only just emerging. Forcing
the academic community to find a position between society, government, and profes-
sional ethos, the First World War wrought two very different champions of academic
freedom: one favoring individual liberties and the other one prioritizing institutional
integrity. These distinctive and potentially adverse interpretations continued to function
as a basis for legal and public arguments as the twentieth century progressed. Two ques-
tions remain: How can the campus be insulated from the public sphere and yet be
intensely engaged with the political community? And is academic freedom a privilege
or a necessity? The AAUP continues its line of argument that ties academic freedom
to workers’ rights and employment justice. They pursued the issue ardently, for
example, during the so-called culture wars of the 1990s and in view of what in recent
years has been termed the neoliberal academic-industrial complex.61 The dominance
of business and financial interest among trustees who try to commodify teaching and
research, bears a striking resemblance to Gilded Age higher education.62 At the same
time, as new threats loom over campuses from both public opinion and government leg-
islation, the administrative definition also has its advocates. After all, institutional auton-
omy and integrity against political intrusion can also protect professors and their
research.
The different interpretations of academic freedom as they first were presented in the
wake of the First World War show that the American use of the concept was plagued
from the outset by an inherent dichotomy of individual versus institutional freedom.
Thus, arguably, to enable the interaction between campus and society in America, aca-
demic freedom is a necessary privilege for researchers and institutions alike, but it can
only work in a system of mutual checks and balances.
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